Bangladesh’s decision to open a humanitarian corridor for Rohingya refugees has sparked widespread controversy. The chief adviser of the interim government of Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus, reportedly agreed to the proposal without consulting key stakeholders, including political parties and the military. The idea was first raised in New York and later discussed when the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, met Muhammad Yunus in Dhaka in February 2025.
On April 7, 2025, National Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman publicly mentioned that the corridor would deliver aid to Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Following this, heavy criticism forced the Bangladesh government to issue repeated clarifications. The situation worsened when the government handed over management of Chittagong Port to a foreign company.
Since former Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina’s removal, Yunus has been leading the interim government, which has so far failed to build consensus around key reforms, despite reports submitted by six reform commissions. A consensus committee was formed, but opposition parties, especially the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), viewed its dialogue efforts as delaying tactics for national elections. The commission planned to disclose unresolved issues and the positions of 38 political parties after 45 sessions on 166 reform recommendations.
As public criticism grew, officials gave conflicting statements. Khalilur Rahman insisted no formal agreement had been made, describing the initiative as a ‘humanitarian channel’, not a corridor to be supervised by the UN. Press Secretary Shafiqul Alam denied any discussions with the UN. BNP’s Tariq Rahman and several political parties criticised the plan, citing threats to sovereignty and lack of consultation. Army Chief Waker-uz-Zaman (also spelt Wakar-uz-Zaman) also condemned the move, stressing concerns over national security and internal instability.
The Rakhine Corridor
The Rakhine Corridor is a proposed route intended to provide humanitarian aid and logistical support, linking Cox’s Bazar in southeastern Bangladesh to Myanmar’s Rakhine state. This is a region plagued by prolonged conflict, especially targeting the Rohingya Muslim community. The idea has gained momentum in response to escalating violence in Myanmar and increasing pressure from global human rights organisations to ensure that aid reaches civilians stranded in the troubled area.
A Humanitarian Proposal but with Geopolitical Ripples
This proposal for an internationally monitored humanitarian corridor through Myanmar’s Rakhine state has stirred a complex geopolitical debate too. It has drawn attention from regional and global powers alike. The corridor, as envisioned, would serve multiple humanitarian purposes, such as facilitating the delivery of aid to civilians affected by conflict, enabling the evacuation of the wounded, etc. It would also pave the way for the voluntary return of Rohingya refugees who were forced to flee to Bangladesh following the 2017 military-led ethnic cleansing campaign in Myanmar.
It was planned to operate the corridor under the supervision of the UN or a coalition of international partners. The corridor would be supported logistically and militarily by participating countries. However, despite being framed as a humanitarian initiative, the proposal has triggered considerable concern due to the sensitive location of the corridor and the array of actors involved.
Security and Political Complexities in Rakhine
The intended route cuts through an area that is currently controlled by Myanmar’s military regime, called junta, and various armed ethnic groups. This geographic reality presents not only significant security risks but also complex political challenges. Any effort to establish a functioning aid corridor would require delicate negotiations and cooperation among parties with conflicting interests and uncertainty. Regional actors are sceptical about the feasibility and sustainability of the initiative, particularly in the absence of broad regional consensus.
Bangladesh’s Position One of the countries most directly impacted by the corridor’s potential implementation is Bangladesh. Having absorbed over a million Rohingya refugees since the 2017 crisis, Bangladesh has been under considerable humanitarian and economic strain. Although the proposed corridor may seem like a step towards addressing the refugee situation, Bangladesh’s military and political establishment have been very cautious about this initiative.
Their chief concern lies in the possibility that the corridor might be implemented without Bangladesh’s explicit involvement or approval. The fear is that the corridor could be controlled by external forces, effectively introducing a foreign presence in its immediate vicinity. This could represent a serious infringement on its sovereignty and diminish its regional standing, particularly if it is seen as sidelined in a matter so closely related to its national interests.
Moreover, the geopolitical implications of the Rakhine Corridor extend well beyond the immediate region, drawing interest from major powers including China, the US, and India.
China’s Strategic Interest in Rakhine For China, Rakhine state holds particular strategic importance. As part of its expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has made significant infrastructure investments in the region. Chief among them is the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, which, along with connected oil and gas pipelines, provides China with a crucial maritime gateway to the Indian Ocean. The route would allow China to bypass the Strait of Malacca, a chokepoint in global shipping vulnerable to disruptions. This would secure China an alternative energy and trade pathway. It would also enhance China’s maritime trade routes and strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Hence, China is likely to view any international humanitarian corridor in Rakhine as a potential challenge to its influence in Myanmar. It may interpret such a development as an encroachment on its strategic space, promoting it to reinforce its alliance with Myanmar’s military regime. Increased Chinese engagement could take the form of additional economic support, military cooperation or a deeper on-the-ground presence, thereby intensifying regional competition.
The US Perspective The US has expressed support for the corridor. For US, the proposal offers more than just a humanitarian solution, it represents a strategic opportunity. By facilitating humanitarian aid in a region under authoritarian control, the US could boost its engagement with Myanmar’s pro-democracy government. At the same time, the corridor could serve as a counterweight to China’s growing footprint in the Bay of Bengal and adjacent areas.
The US support for the initiative is consistent with its broader regional strategy, which emphasises freedom of navigation, democratic governance, and strategic competition with China. However, this posture has its own risks. By backing the corridor, the US may inadvertently entangle Bangladesh in wider rivalry between US and China. For Bangladesh, which has traditionally sought to maintain a balanced relationship with both the US and China, this could further complicate its diplomatic positioning and trigger unwanted pressures from competing sides.
India’s Cautious Engagement and Regional Priorities India, too, is watching the development of the Rakhine Corridor with a caution. India shares its borders with both Bangladesh and Myanmar. India’s concerns stem from its proximity to the proposed corridor and the potential regional consequences. India’s primary consideration is the impact of the corridor on regional stability. With armed groups active in Myanmar’s border areas and ongoing unrest in the Rakhine region, any disruption could spill across borders, affecting India’ northeastern states.
Also, India holds significant strategic interests in Rakhine, primarily through the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, a collaborative initiative with Myanmar. This project aims to connect India’s Kolkata Port with Myanmar’s Sittwe Port, a deep-sea port developed by India on the Bay of Bengal. It also involves constructing a land route from Kolkata to Myanmar via Aizawl in India’s northeast in line with the India’s Act East Policy. This route is designed to bypass the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow and strategically sensitive stretch known as the ‘Chicken Neck’.
India is also wary of an expanded Chinese presence in Rakhine, especially near its own eastern frontier. From the standpoint of India’s Act East Policy, which aims to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asia, increased Chinese activity along this corridor could undercut India’s strategic ambitions. Additionally, India has its own interests in the Bay of Bengal, where it has invested in maritime infrastructure and connectivity projects as mentioned. The presence of a western-backed corridor or a Chinese response to it, could upset the current strategic equilibrium of the region.
Way forward
The Rakhine Corridor proposal is far more than a humanitarian mechanism. It is a focal point where the interest of multiple countries and powers converge and where strategic calculations intersect with humanitarian concerns. While the primary objective remains the provision of relief and the potential return of displaced populations, the reality is that the corridor cannot be considered in isolation from the geopolitical context in which it exists. Its location in a conflict-ridden zone complicates implementation, while the lack of unified support from regional actors such as Bangladesh and India further diminishes its prospects for success. Meanwhile, the involvement of global players like the US and China ensures that any movement on the proposal would be interpreted through power competition.
For China, the corridor represents a potential challenge to its long-term investment in Myanmar and its strategic access to the Indian Ocean.
For the US, the corridor is a means to support democratic aspirations of Myanmar while pushing back against Chinese expansion. However, this approach risks pulling smaller nations like Bangladesh into broader geopolitical rivalries.
India, with its border proximity and strategic ambitions, views the corridor through the dual lenses of security and competition. Its concerns revolve around both regional stability and the potential ramifications for its own influence in the Indo-Pacific.
For Bangladesh, this initiative could result in serious and unexpected consequences both domestically and internationally. Although intended to serve humanitarian purposes, it poses considerable security risks. These include threats to national security, the potential for drug trafficking and other cross-border crimes and the likelihood that armed groups in Myanmar, particularly non-state actors, could exploit the corridor. Additionally, it may intensify existing geopolitical tensions, raise concerns over national sovereignty, and lead to unintended outcomes such as heightened political instability and social unrest.
Conclusion
To conclude, the destiny of the Rakhine Corridor would depend on more than just humanitarian imperatives. It would require navigating strategic interests, national sensitivities, and regional rivalries. Without inclusive dialogue and careful diplomatic engagement, even well-intentioned initiative like this would become flashpoints in an already fragile geopolitical landscape. In fact, this corridor must serve as a symbol of inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding; not just a route for supplies. Hopefully, the corridor would open the door for a new regional ethic of accountability and resilience besides humanitarian aid, provided the project is carried out with utmost caution, bravery, and collaboration.
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