Spectrum Books - 2024 Bangladesh Protests

2024 Bangladesh Protests

Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s sudden and swift resignation from power on August 5, 2024, has left many questioning how she could be forced to step down and even leave the country, despite her seemingly complete control. Bangladesh has experienced chaos and bloodshed due to the departure of Hasina, with her partymen, religious minorities, policemen, and border guards targeted, resulting in several deaths and hundreds of injuries.

The Economic Times’s (August 8, 2024) article Bangladesh crisis: How student protests brought in a new leader mentioned the chronology of events. The protests in Bangladesh, a South Asian nation of about 170 million people, began on July 1, 2024, with university students demanding reforms to a quota system for public sector jobs. The protesters claimed the scheme was used to stack the civil services with loyalists of Hasina’s ruling Awami League. Hasina, who won a fifth term in January 2024, said the students were “wasting their time”. Violence intensified on July 16, with six people killed in clashes. Hasina’s government ordered the nationwide closure of schools and universities. On July 18, Hasina rebuffed the protesters, a day after she appealed for calm and promised to punish every “murder” in the protests. Clashes escalated despite a round-the-clock curfew, the deployment of soldiers, and an Internet blackout. The Supreme Court later ruled the decision to reintroduce job quotas illegal, but it fell short of protesters’ demands to abolish reserved jobs for children of “freedom fighters” from Bangladesh’s 1971 Independence War against Pakistan. On August 5, Hasina was toppled by helicopter, and Bangladesh army chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman announced that Hasina had resigned, and an interim government would be formed. On August 8, Nobel Peace Prize winner, Muhammad Yunus, 84, arrived in Dhaka to lead a caretaker government, expected to be sworn in later that day, aiming for what the army chief has vowed, will be a “beautiful democratic process”.

The Hindu (August 6, 2024) in its reporting The quota for freedom fighters at the centre of the Bangladesh protests mentioned the evolution of Bangladesh Civil Service quota system over the years. In 1972, after the formation of Bangladesh, the Ministry of Cabinet Services ordered the introduction of the quota system for the new Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). The initial quota system allocated 30 per cent of jobs to freedom fighters also called “Mukti joddhas”, 10 per cent to Liberation War-affected women, and 40 per cent to people of various districts, leaving a 20 per cent merit allocation for government job recruitment. In 1976, the district-based allotment was reduced to 20 per cent, with 40 per cent of jobs reserved for merit-based candidates. In 1985, quota for war-affected women amended and made 10 per cent reservation for all women. The quota for freedom fighters remains at 30 per cent, while district-based quotas have been reduced to 10 per cent. A new 5 per cent reservation was introduced for members of indigenous communities. The allocation for merit-based jobs increased to 45 per cent. In 1997, the government extended quotas for freedom fighters to their children. In 2010, the quota for freedom fighters was further extended to their grandchildren. In 2012, one per cent quota was introduced for persons with disabilities, increasing the BCS quota to 56 per cent as opposed to 44 per cent for merit. Job reservations included 30 per cent for freedom fighter families, 10 per cent for women, 10 per cent for underdeveloped districts, 5 per cent for indigenous communities, and one per cent for disabled individuals. In 2018, following nationwide protests, the government cancelled the quota system for first-and second-class jobs. In June 2024, the High Court ruled the 2018 reservation cancellation order illegal and reinstated the old quota system, sparking student protests in the country. Protesters claimed the system rewards supporters of Hasina and demanded the demolition of the 30 per cent quota. Government appeals were made in the Supreme Court. In July 2024, the Supreme Court reduced the veterans’ quota to 5 per cent, with 93 per cent of jobs allocated for merit, and 2 per cent reserved for ethnic minorities, transgender, and disabled individuals.

BBC’s (August 6, 2024) article What sparked the protests that toppled Bangladesh's PM?, by Anbarasan Ethirajan and Hannah Ritchie, highlights the protests in Bangladesh, which began in early July as peaceful demands from university students to abolish quotas in civil service jobs, a third of which are reserved for relatives of veterans from Bangladesh’s 1971 War for independence. The campaigners argued that the system was discriminatory and needed to be overhauled. Although their request was largely met, the protests soon transformed into a wider anti-government movement with people from all walks of life joining. As the movement expanded, clashes followed, and over 300 people were killed in the unrest. Bangladeshi media and protesters blamed police for the death toll, while the government maintained that officers opened fire only out of self-defence or to protect state property. Prime Minister Hasina repeatedly cut off Internet access, imposed a nationwide curfew, and described those demonstrating against her as “terrorists” seeking to destabilise the nation. The campaign of civil disobedience showed little signs of abating, and fears of a prolonged standoff could lead to more bloodshed. On students’ participating in large number in protest, the author explained that Bangladesh, despite being one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, had not been able to create jobs for university graduates. Around 18 million young Bangladeshis are seeking jobs, and university graduates face higher unemployment rates than their less-educated peers. The country’s ready-to-wear clothing exports, which employ over four million people, have sold around US$ 40 billion worth of clothes to the global market. However, factory jobs are not sufficient for the younger generation, leading to protests against government job quotas, which they believe would create more jobs for them. Protests against Hasina’s government in Bangladesh continued even after top courts scrapped quotas, fuelled by the brutal crackdown. Bangladesh under her rule saw significant improvements in infrastructure, including roads, bridges, factories, and a metro rail, but corruption allegations persisted. The World Bank reported a tripled per capita income in the last decade, bringing over 25 million people out of poverty, but many believed it benefited the PM’s Awami League. Corruption in Bangladesh has been rampant, particularly among those close to the ruling party. Social media has been filled with discussions about corruption allegations against former top officials, including former army chief, ex-police chief, senior tax officers, and state recruitment officials. The anti-corruption commission has started investigating former police chief Benazir Ahmed for amassing millions of dollars, who denied the allegations. Despite promises to tackle corruption, Hasina admitted to sacking a household assistant for allegedly stealing US$ 34 million of state funds. Rights activists pointed out that space for democratic activity shrank under Hasina’s watch, with the government accused of stifling dissent, silencing media and critics, and jailing or disappearing its strongest critics. However, ministers deny the charges. It is believed that anger against the government and the ruling party had been accumulating for a long time, leading people to resort to protest if they had no option.

Deccan Herald in its reporting on August 6, 2024, mentioned China and Pakistan’s, ISI behind the escalation of student-led protests in Bangladesh. The report cited that the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, known for its anti-India stance, has a role in inflaming the protests and turning student demonstrations against quota into an effort to dethrone Hasina. The ISI-backed Jamaat-e-Islami received significant financial backing to destabilise the Sheikh Hasina government earlier this year, with a significant portion of this funding believed to have originated from Chinese entities operating in Pakistan. The ultimate goal of the ISI-backed Jamaat-e-Islami is to establish a Taliban-type government in Bangladesh, with ISI assuring them of their support due to the strengthening ties between the Indian and Bangladesh governments.

The Economic Times (August 9, 2024) in its editorial Bangladesh protests are not the first time student uprisings have helped bring about radical change mentions the student protests of other countries. Just like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka in 2022, experienced widespread protests that led to the downfall of the government, with youth playing a crucial role. The protests began in March 2022 due to an economic crisis, resulting in a shortage of essentials and an extended power outage. In April, university students and other young people occupied President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s office in Colombo, demanding his resignation. They set up a tent camp called “Gota Go Gama” or “Gota Go Village,” a play on Gotabaya’s nickname “Gota”. The protest site was peaceful, with organisers offering free food, water, toilets, and even medical care for people. The government imposed a curfew, declared a state of emergency, and restricted access to social media, but were unable to stop the protest. Under pressure, many ministers resigned, but President Rajapaksa and his brother, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, remained. In May, Rajapaksa supporters attacked the protest camp, drawing widespread condemnation and forcing him to resign. Rajapaksa clung to power until July when protesters stormed his official residence, forcing him to flee the country. After taking temporary refuge in the Maldives, Rajapaksa later resigned. The situation has since calmed, and Wickremesinghe has addressed food, fuel, and medicine shortages and restored power. However, complaints persist about increased taxes and electric bills in the new government’s efforts to meet International Monetary Fund loan conditions, with former Prime Minister Rajapaksa’s son, Namal Rajapaksa, running in the September presidential elections.

Similarly, in November 1973, Athens Polytechnic students protested against the military dictatorship that had ruled Greece for over six years. Military officers seized power in a 1967 Coup, establishing a dictatorship marked by the arrest, exile and torture of its political opponents. The regime’s brutality and hardline rule led to growing opposition, particularly among students, culminating in the November uprising. Students staged a strike at the university and occupied the campus, with thousands supporting the protest and calls to end the dictatorship. Later, the military crushed the revolt with a tank attack, killing several students. The number of fatalities is still disputed, but the regime announced 15 dead at the time. Days after the uprising, another military dictator staged a coup and implemented a harsher regime. However, a series of events led to a return to democracy in 1974. A prosecutor’s report estimated the fatalities at 34, but only mentioned 18 names. Today, annual marches in Athens commemorate the pro-democracy student uprising, attracting thousands of people.

Another case involves American students, who protested against the US involvement in Vietnam, leading to President Richard Nixon’s authorisation of attacks on neutral Cambodia in April 1970. On May 4, 1970, hundreds of students at Ohio’s Kent State University gathered to protest the bombing of Cambodia. The Ohio National Guard failed to disperse the crowd, leading to the May 4 Massacre. This confrontation was a turning point for a nation divided over the conflict, resulting in over 58,000 deaths. It sparked a strike of 4 million students across the US, temporarily closing 900 colleges and universities. Historians argue that the events played a pivotal role in turning public opinion against the conflict in Southeast Asia.

The Times of India editorial (Aug 5, 2024) In Dhaka, they rose, so she fell by Shahab Enam Khan mentions Sheikh Hasina’s expulsion from Bangladesh marks a new chapter in the country’s history. It is driven by the Bangladeshi youth, who have faced three consecutive controversial elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024. The recent protests led by the ‘Students against Discrimination’ group have brought the Hasina regime to its knees and ended the Awami League era. Chief of army staff, General Waker-uz-Zaman, has promised justice and a well-structured interim government, sparking optimism amidst the chaos. The formation of a credible interim government will be critical, as it will follow Zaman’s discussions with all political parties and civil society. The Awami League’s lack of empathy for the students and their causes was deeply scarring, and it came on top of a sharp rise in inflation, uncertainties about welfare, and fear of persecution. Remittance earners joined the protests by reducing inward remittance through banking channels, which exposed pre-existing grievances. The larger public joined the students’ protests because their grievances resonated, and this unity underscores the complex way in which social issues and individual and collective aspirations fuel protests. The protests were not led by one individual or one political party, but by young students, showing the power of youth leadership. However, Awami League political barons continue to speak harshly about the students, equating them with extremist entities, much like the former PM equated them with anti-liberation actors, popularly known as razakars. The abuse of the terms razakar and ‘anti-liberation’ was intended to silence critical voices, creating an environment of fear across the political ecosystem. Many question whether the highest government offices stopped receiving an accurate political assessment of grassroots reality and resentment from its political barons. Changing social demography, technologies, and access to entitlements were functioning in intertwined ways, which went unnoticed. The key actors were the disfranchised youth, and ignoring their socio-economic demands backfired. Statist narratives continued to hype up infra projects, instead of acknowledging the disparities and grievances on top of this infra. The interim government’s critical task is to reform electoral institutions to make them substantially inclusive, backed by restoring an economy plagued by corruption and unsustainable ventures. Money siphoned out needs to be brought back to stabilise the economy, and conducting credible inquiries into the killing of protesters is crucial. With one government gone, the new government will have very difficult work to do in the coming days.

The Hindu in its editorial From hope to despair: On Bangladesh after Sheikh Hasina dated August 7, 2024, mentioned that Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s dramatic escape from Dhaka led to a re-evaluation of her actions and the legacy she holds. Previously seen as the hope of Bangladesh’s youth and a Prime Minister who revitalised the country’s economy, Hasina was later seen as the students’ greatest adversary, responsible for over 300 deaths in protests. Despite her crackdown on terrorist camps in 2009, handing criminals to India, and her campaign against radicalisation, she was recently criticised for using strong-arm tactics against her opponents. The student protests over quotas may have been the final straw, leading to allegations of vote rigging and media suppression. Even after winning elections for a fourth term, Hasina continued down this path, with cases and jail terms against Nobel Laureate and Grameen Bank founder, Muhammad Yunus. Her actions have tarnished the legacy of her father, the founder of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The extreme mob violence and protests may have had political support, possibly from Pakistan and the United States (US), which had ties with the Awami League government. The underlying involvement of Islamist groups could affect religious tolerance and secularism that Hasina tried to usher in during her 15-year tenure. For India, these outcomes must be cause for introspection. India must reflect on the actions of Hasina, who was not only complicit in her actions but also failed to engage with Bangladeshi opposition members, losing their goodwill. The Modi government’s uncritical support for Hasina led to her accepting unpopular decisions like the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. While ensuring her safety, the government must not waste time engaging with the next regime and work towards a peaceful transition to a more inclusive democracy in Bangladesh.

Pratap Bhanu Mehta in his editorial, From Bangladesh’s students, a message: A fighting chance in The Indian Express dated August 7, 2024, argued that the end of Sheikh Hasina’s rule in Bangladesh is a moment of opportunity and risk for India. It is crucial to view Bangladesh within the context of democratic institutionalisation and not view it as a staging ground for anti-India groups operating in the North-east. India has vital interests in Bangladesh, and any violence against Hindus in Bangladesh will have a profound impact on domestic politics in India, which in turn will affect Bangladesh politics. The army and student movement in Bangladesh have shown positive indications of not allowing this to happen. However, India’s narcissism has blindsided them, leading to a partisan role in Bangladesh politics and failing to acknowledge the complexities of Bangladesh as a society. The Indian right wing’s construction of the event as a foreign conspiracy or Islamist frame alienates the Bangladeshi people, calling them dupes with no agency of their own. This is the same mistake made by Hasina by calling her own students razakars. Bangladesh’s politics has been tensed due to its independence and the question of its identity as a religious or secular nation. Successive rulers, like Ziaur Rahman, have incorporated a more Islamic hue into the constitution and given more space to Islamist groups, making them a significant feature of Bangladesh politics. Sheikh Hasina accommodated Islamist groups in response to mass mobilisations against atheist bloggers, but also used the religious pretext to legitimise laws clamping down on freedom of expression. Islamism will remain a strain in Bangladesh politics. In India, the construction that only pro-India authoritarianism can keep Islamism at bay has led to issues. Islamism thrives partly because it has the patronage of autocrats and because secular opposition has been suppressed. As democratic spaces open up, Islamist groups may become more visible for a while. But as with all modernising societies, we have to look at the long game. Bangladesh has a chance of making it a democracy, albeit with some conflict. The character of civil society in Bangladesh is different from Pakistan, with religious parties often substituting for the state in electoral politics. Bangladesh has a robustly institutionalised secular civil society organisation, which could be seen as a potential zone of freedom. The second tension is the institutionalisation of the party system. An interim government will ensure free and fair elections, with all parties participating. However, a boycott by the Awami League or lower turnouts could lead to a slide from democratic upsurge to centralised authoritarianism. The problem in Bangladesh is not just that winning parties have enjoyed a monopoly of power, but also that each party becomes a small cabal controlled by an opaque inner circle. A genuine party system might emerge with the shadow of Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia fading, but creating a party system more attuned to rotating and sharing power and committed to a core set of institutional values is crucial. Otherwise, the current tendencies of social movement upsurge, brief democracy, and consolidation of an autocratic party affiliated state will continue.

It is for this reason that student movements have been so powerful in Bangladesh, challenging authoritarianism and maintaining democratic legitimacy. They have been at the forefront of various movements, including the language movement in 1952 and the independence movement in 1971. The image of Abu Sayed, a student who was shot, reveals the character of the Bangladeshi state. Similar movements have been seen in India during the Emergency, regional movements in Assam, and the agitation for Telangana. However, the state’s responsiveness did not lead to violence. Bangladesh’s student-led movement offers hope as a society contentiously trying to carve out its own future. However, there is no guarantee that these movements will lead to change. The global trend of popular uprisings has not always been positive. Apart from other things, Bangladesh faces economic challenges. But no power, especially India, should short circuit the complex process of internal modernisation Bangladesh is going through, for its own short-term ends. And if Bangladesh can internalise the message of its students — that religious nationalism is the surest road to authoritarianism — the region will have a fighting chance.

T.S. Tirumurti in his editorial Change in Bangladesh, the challenges for India dated August 9, 2024, in The Hindu recalls the events of February 2009 when (now former) Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina faced a major crisis within two months of her taking over. The mutiny of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), where rebels took over Dhaka’s headquarters, resulted in 74 deaths, with 57 being army officers. The unrest spread to 12 other towns and cities, posing a threat to the democratically elected government. Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon was called back from Colombo by the then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, where the writer was the Head of Division for Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and the Maldives. Menon met with Ambassadors of important countries to convey India’s concern and seek their understanding. The mutiny failed, as Hasina had just come to power on ‘clean’ elections with significant backing from women and youth, but her tenure seemed to have been squandered.

The 2024 Elections were least inclusionary due to the Opposition’s boycott, resulting in dwindling democratic space, human rights erosion, severe economic downturn, and high unemployment among the youth, who had previously benefited from sustained economic growth under Hasina. The Anti-Discrimination Student Movement’s protests, which were handled ham-handedly and violently, sealed Hasina’s fate as they were perceived as enemies of the state. However, Bangladesh Army Chief General Waker-uz-Zaman faces a different situation than when Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed took over in 2007. In 2007, the army was needed to control anarchy, restore governance, and facilitate elections. In 2024, the army is seen as facilitating the will of the people by driving out a beleaguered prime minister and restoring the democratic process. This has made the army more vulnerable and responsive to public opinion. The students’ choice of Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus as the interim government head reveals a vulnerability in Bangladesh. Typically, coup leaders nominate technocrats, but Yunus’s popularity and respect may be a silver lining for the army. Yunus is a passionate supporter of democratic values and the rule of law, known as a Hasina-baiter. Although he has political ambitions and wants to start his own party, he is not close to the main parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. This could be a springboard for Yunus to launch a third force in Bangladesh. The selection of the interim government in Bangladesh is not the only challenge. Students’ agitation is being influenced by those suppressed under the previous regime or those boycotting elections or supported from outside the country. This includes the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, opposition, and banned Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami. Violence against Awami League sympathisers, destruction of symbols of Bangladesh liberation, and attacks on the Hindu minority community are also issues. Accommodating these polarised forces in the interim government could weaken both Yunus and the army, potentially allowing anti-India forces to gain control.

India, the first country to flag “contemporary forms of religiophobia against non-Abrahamic religions” in the UN Security Council and General Assembly, has since resisted, raising concerns more forcefully with its neighbours and the West. Recent events in Bangladesh have demonstrated that if India does not, nobody will.

Bangladesh’s situation is similar to Myanmar’s, where coup leaders struggle to maintain control over the people and ethnic groups after three consecutive elections. After four consecutive elections in Bangladesh, where peoples’ democratic aspirations have been raised, the military will find its role considerably circumscribed. For India, the situation seems similar to what happened in the Maldives where it, inter alia, propped up President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih without building bridges to the other side and facing a backlash when the opposition came to power. What is in its favour though, whether in the Maldives or Afghanistan or Sri Lanka, or now in Bangladesh, is the strong development partnership and projects it has built for the benefit of their peoples. India’s best bet is to work closely with Yunus, the army, and the people to benefit their communities.

mint (August 6, 2024) reported India’s external minister’s take on Bangladesh protests. He stated that India has been “in regular touch with authorities in Dhaka” and the Indian community in Bangladesh amid the violence and political developments in the neighbouring country. As violence continued throughout July, we repeatedly counselled restrain and urged the situation be diffused through dialogue. Similar urgings were made to various political forces with whom we were in touch. He further added, “We are in close and continuous touch with the Indian community in Bangladesh through our diplomatic missions and it is our expectation that the host government will provide the required security protection for these establishments.”

The Statesmen (August 11, 2024) reported tens of thousands of Hindus gathered in Chittagong, Bangladesh, to hold a protest rally against ongoing attacks on the community and demand safety and equal rights as citizens. The violence against Hindus has increased significantly since former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation to India. The ongoing violence comes as a massive challenge for the interim government, which was sworn-in on Thursday under Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus.
The Bangladesh Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Oikya Parishad sent an open letter to Yunus, expressing “profound sorrow and concern” over the group’s “unprecedented violence” against minorities. The letter mentioned that the communal violence began immediately after Hasina left Dhaka, causing widespread fear, anxiety, and uncertainty among minorities in Bangladesh. Dhaka Hindu Jagran Mancha organised processions and rallies to protest against vandalism, arson, looting, and attacks on the Hindu community across the country. The Hindu community presented a four-point demand: the establishment of a ministry of minorities, the formation of a minority protection commission, the implementation of strict laws to prevent attacks against minorities, and the allocation of 10 per cent of parliamentary seats for minorities. The interim government is also facing criticism from several quarters for exclusion of religious texts other than the Quran during its swearing-in ceremony. Kajal Devnath, a member of the unity council, expressed hope that in future state functions, readings from all major religious texts will be included.

Aditya Pratap Singh in its editorial Implications of upheaval in Bangladesh on its trade relations and relations with India dated August 11, 2024, in the pioneer raised concerns about the potential impact on trade, economic stability, and the region’s geopolitical dynamics due to sudden turn of events in Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh have built strong economic ties over the past decade, with infrastructure and connectivity projects playing a crucial role. India has extended US$ 8 billion in credit to Bangladesh since 2016, focusing on road, rail, shipping, and port infrastructure development. The two nations have also engaged in commerce, including medical tourism, business expansion, and international garment trade. Bangladesh, a major player in the global garment industry, relies heavily on cotton imports from India. Bangladesh’s textile and garment sectors contribute 56 per cent of its total exports to India, making it a crucial trading partner in South Asia. The Union Ministry of Commerce reported that bilateral trade between the two countries reached US$ 13 billion in the 2023–24 financial year.

Sheikh Hasina’s leadership has led to a significant trade surplus between India and Bangladesh, but the ongoing political turmoil in Bangladesh threatens to disrupt this economic partnership. The civil unrest and worsening economic situation have created security concerns that could impact Indian exports, commerce, and infrastructure projects in the neighbouring country. India’s exports to Bangladesh dropped from US$ 12.21 billion in 2022–23 to US$ 11 billion in 2023–24, and Bangladesh's imports decreased from US$ 2 billion to US$ 1.84 billion in the most recent fiscal year. Indian exporters are concerned about the instability in Bangladesh, which could negatively affect commerce between the two nations.

India and Bangladesh discussed a free trade agreement (FTA) in October 2023. The agreement could streamline regulations, encourage investment and commerce, and potentially remove customs tariffs, boosting trade. According to a 2012 World Bank working paper, a full-product FTA could increase Bangladesh’s exports to India by 182 per cent, while a partial FTA could grow them by 134 per cent. This would strengthen Bangladesh’s trade transport infrastructure and commerce links. However, the current political crisis and Sheikh Hasina’s exit could delay or pause the FTA, potentially affecting the expansion of commerce and trade in new areas.

The ongoing crisis in Bangladesh could negatively impact the textile and garment industry, which exported US$ 42.613 billion worth of garments in 2021–22. The recent incidents of factories being set on fire have raised concerns about the future of this industry, as many textile units are owned by traders linked to the Awami League Party, making them vulnerable in the current political climate.

India has the potential to supply garments to developed economies, but it faces drawbacks to this shift. Bangladesh, a least developed country, benefits from zero-duty advantages while Indian goods face tariff barriers. If borders remain closed and duty-free export-import activities are suspended, there may be increased demand for Indian garments. However, it is still too early to make definitive predictions about the opportunities and gains that might arise from this situation.