The demonstrations in Bangladesh, which have escalated into one of the most significant political crises in the country, were sparked by widespread discontent over a government job quota system. This system reserved 56 per cent of government positions for various groups, including 30 per cent for descendants of freedom fighters from the 1971 War of Independence. Many young Bangladeshis, facing high unemployment rates, viewed this quota as a barrier to securing coveted civil service jobs, especially as numerous positions were allegedly filled by supporters of the ruling Awami League party. In response to mounting pressure from student protests, government abolished the quota system in 2018 for the first class and second class jobs. However, in June 2024, the high court ruled this abolition illegal and reinstated the old quota system, reigniting protests across the nation. The situation intensified in July when public university faculty and students organised walkouts over proposed pension reforms that would involve salary deductions. Initially peaceful, the protests turned violent after Hasina labeled the demonstrators as razakars, a term historically associated with pro-Pakistan collaborators during the War of Independence. The ruling party’s student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League, along with police and the Rapid Action Battalion—a controversial paramilitary group—responded with brutal force, deploying tear gas and live ammunition against the protesters. The violence led to the deaths of approximately 266 individuals, predominantly students, and sparked a larger uprising demanding Hasina’s resignation. The government’s attempts to suppress dissent included closing schools and universities, imposing curfews, and cutting Internet access, which only fueled public outrage. As protests escalated, a violent non-cooperation movement emerged, culminating in a mass march toward Dhaka, vandalisation of the statue of Sheikh Hasina’s father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at different places and a mob attack on Sheikh Hasina’s residence. On August 5, 2024, amid rising tensions and violence, Hasina resigned and fled the country. This unrest is part of a broader context of dissatisfaction with Hasina’s rule and governance. Despite notable GDP growth, many citizens have not seen improvements in their living conditions, facing issues like inflation and unemployment. Corruption scandals have plagued the government, undermining its claims of a zero-tolerance policy towards such practices. Furthermore, the ruling party has been accused of eroding democratic norms, suppressing dissent, and criminalising criticism, leading to a climate of fear among activists and opposition figures. The legacy of the 1971 War of Independence continues to influence Bangladeshi politics, as political parties often invoke their credentials from this period to legitimise their authority. The war’s historical significance is deeply embedded in the national identity, shaping contemporary political narratives and conflicts.
Legacy of the 1971 War of Independence
The relevance of the 1971 War of Independence in contemporary Bangladeshi politics is profound, as it remains a cornerstone of the nation’s identity and political landscape. The roots of this conflict can be traced back to the 1947 partition of British India, which led to the division of Bengal into East and West Pakistan. Following this division, East Pakistan faced political and economic marginalisation from West Pakistan, which sought to impose a singular national identity despite the distinct cultural and linguistic heritage of the Bengali people. The imposition of policies that marginalised the Bengali language and culture, alongside attempts to erase Hindu influences, fueled widespread discontent, leading to significant student protests and a growing independence movement. In March 1971, a brutal military crackdown by West Pakistan aimed at suppressing pro-independence sentiments ignited a genocidal war that lasted nine months, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 5,00,000 to 3 million Bangladeshis. The aftermath of the war has left a lasting imprint on Bangladeshi politics, with major political parties, including the Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina, often invoking their credentials related to the War of Independence to legitimise their authority and undermine opposition. This historical narrative continues to shape political discourse, as leaders often refer to the events of 1971 to rally support or delegitimise rivals. All this highlights the war’s enduring impact on national identity and political dynamics.
Chronology of the Protests
July 1 Demonstrations take place in Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka, to demand the cancellation of a quota system in civil service recruitment, which reserves 56 per cent of jobs for people from various categories. Student claims that the quota system is discriminatory in nature. Demonstrations began after the High Court reinstated the quota system in June 2024, overturning a 2018 government decision. While the government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, students refused to wait for the outcome and demanded a new executive order cancelling the quotas.
July 14 Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina criticised students’ demands to remove quotas for children and grandchildren of war veterans, leading to widespread student outrage.
July 15 The Awami League’s senior leader announced that the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the student wing, would respond to students’ protests. BCL activists attacked anti-quota students at Dhaka University and Dhaka Medical College Hospital, resulting in over 300 injuries and causing widespread chaos.
July 17 Hasina addressed the nation on television, expressing sorrow over the deaths and announcing a judicial inquiry to hold perpetrators accountable. She urged students to await the Supreme Court’s verdict on quotas and hoped the outcome would not disappoint them. Students responded by calling for a “complete shutdown” of transportation across the country the next day.
July 18 A “complete shutdown” programme in Dhaka and 19 other districts led to massive violence, with at least 29 confirmed deaths. Tens of thousands of students and other groups enforced the shutdown of transportation, setting on fire cars, buses, and the state-run television centre in Dhaka.
July 19 Some 66 people were killed in clashes between protesters and police. A mob freed nearly 900 inmates from a jail in central Narsingdi district and looted 80 firearms and 1,000 rounds of ammunition. The government declared a night-time curfew and deployed the army to maintain order.
July 20 At least 21 people were killed during the first day of curfew, leading to the government announcing two days of ‘general holiday’ and detaining leaders of the quota movement and some leaders of opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
July 21 The Supreme Court delivers its verdict in the quota case, abolishing most of the quotas for civil service jobs. The 30 per cent quota was reduced to 5 per cent, and 2 per cent was reserved for ethnic minorities, leaving 93 per cent of spaces for general applicants to be decided on merit. However, the curfew continues, resulting in the deaths of seven more individuals.
July 23–25 The government formalised a new quota allocation in line with the Supreme Court verdict, but student protest organisers argue that it is too late and too many people have already been killed. The arrest of opposition leaders continues. The protestors renewed their demands, which included the release of protests leaders, the discontinuation of the curfew and the reopening of the university campus.
July 26 Bangladesh’s police department’s Detective Branch arrested three organisers of the student movement. The BNP calls for the ouster of the government.
July 27 Diplomatic missions of 14 Western countries in Dhaka issue a joint letter, urging law enforcement accountability for wrongdoings, while the Detective Branch arrested two more organisers of the student movement, and police continued raids. There was demand for Sheikh Hasina to step down as prime minister.
July 31 The government commemorates a “mourning day” in honour of those who lost their lives in violence, but students reject the day. Supporters of the student movement turned their social media profiles red to express their rejection.
August 1 The government issued a notification banning the Jamaat-e-Islami party, its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, and its affiliates accusing them of being terrorists’ entity.
August 3 Student organisers demand the resignation of Hasina and the formation of a new “national government” led by an “acceptable to all” person. Hasina offers talks but students reject them.
August 4–5 Tens of thousands of people from Dhaka and surrounding areas defied the curfew to converge on the capital’s centre. The army initially attempts to halt the flow of people, but then permits them to enter, leading to crowds storming Hasina’s official residence. By the afternoon, Hasina hands her resignation letter to President Mohammed Shahabuddin and, along with her sister Sheikh Rehana, flies to neighbouring India. Army Chief General Waker-uz-Zaman invites political parties, including banned Jamaat-e-Islami, for talks, announcing an interim government formation after consultation with the president.
August 8 Muhammad Yunus, the Nobel laureate, returned from Europe and formed the interim government, along with two student leaders in senior positions, tasked with ending disorder and implementing democratic reforms.
August 10 Protesters demanded a revamp of the judiciary, leading to the resignation of chief justice Obaidul Hassan.
August 11 Syed Refaat Ahmed was sworn in as Bangladesh’s new chief justice.
Causes of the Protests
Discontent over quota system The protests were initially ignited by widespread discontent with the government’s employment quota system. This system, originally designed to benefit the descendants of those who fought in the 1971 Liberation War, has become a focal point of anger, particularly among students. Many argue that the system is outdated and disproportionately benefits certain groups at the expense of merit-based opportunities. The government’s refusal to adequately address these concerns led to an outpouring of anger, particularly among the youth.
Evolution of Bangladesh Quota System
In 1972, the Ministry of Cabinet Services ordered the introduction of the quota system for the new Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). The initial quota system allocated 30 per cent of jobs to freedom fighters also called Mukti joddhas, 10 per cent to Liberation War-affected women, and 40 per cent to for people of various districts, leaving a 20 per cent merit allocation for government job recruitment.
In 1976, the district-based allotment was reduced to 20 per cent, with 40 per cent of jobs reserved for merit-based candidates.
In 1985, quota for war-affected women amended and made 10 per cent reservation for all women. The quota for freedom fighters remains at 30 per cent, while district-based quotas have been reduced to 10 per cent. A new 5 per cent reservation was introduced for members of indigenous communities. The allocation for merit-based jobs increased to 45 per cent.
In 1997, the government has extended quotas for freedom fighters to their children.
In 2010, the quota for freedom fighters was further extended to their grandchildren.
In 2012, one per cent quota was introduced for persons with disabilities, increasing the BCS quota to 56 per cent as opposed to 44 per cent for merit. Job reservations included 30 per cent for freedom fighter families, 10 per cent for women, 10 per cent for underdeveloped districts, 5 per cent for indigenous communities, and one per cent for disabled individuals.
In 2018, following nationwide protests, the government cancelled the quota system for first and second-class jobs.
In June 2024, the High Court ruled the 2018 reservation cancellation order illegal and reinstated the old quota system, sparking student protests in the country. Protesters claimed the system rewards supporters of Hasina and demanded the demolition of the 30 per cent quota. Government appeals were made in the Supreme Court.
In July 2024, the Supreme Court reduced the veterans’ quota to 5 per cent, with 93 per cent of jobs allocated for merit, and 2 per cent reserved for ethnic minorities, transgender, and disabled individuals.
Economic and political grievances Beyond the immediate issue of the quota system, there is deep-seated frustration with the government’s handling of economic and political issues. The economy is yet to recover from the impact of COVID-19 pandemic. According to World Bank, the country’s real GDP had slowed to 5.8 per cent in 2022–23 from 7.1 per cent in 2021–22. With inflation at around 30 per cent, general dissatisfaction is very high. Foreign exchange reserves have fallen by 44 per cent in three years, raising apprehensions of Bangladesh’s capacity to pay back loans taken from multilateral organisations. The value of the Bangladesh Taka has dropped 28 per cent this year. These economic grievances have merged with political discontent, particularly regarding the government's increasingly authoritarian tendencies.
Unemployment Bangladesh has seen significant economic growth in recent years, but this has not translated into equal opportunities for all. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, remains high, and many accuse the government of corruption and mismanagement. Around 18 million young Bangladeshis are seeking jobs, and university graduates face higher unemployment rates than their less-educated peers. Private sector jobs are hard to come by. Against these odds, government jobs are seen as a stable alternative for those entering the job market.
Corruption charges Corruption in Bangladesh has been rampant, particularly among those close to the ruling party. Social media has been filled with discussions about corruption allegations against former top officials, including former army chief, ex-police chief, senior tax officers, and state recruitment officials. The anti-corruption commission has started investigating former police chief Benazir Ahmed for amassing millions of dollars, who denied the allegations. Despite promises to tackle corruption, Hasina admitted to sacking a household assistant for allegedly stealing US$ 34 million of state funds. Rights activists have pointed out that space for democratic activity has shrunk under Hasina’s watch, with the government accused of stifling dissent, silencing media and critics, and jailing or disappearing its strongest critics. It is believed that anger against the government and ruling party has been accumulating for a long time, leading people to resort to protest if they have no recourse.
Suppression of opposition and civil rights The government’s response to the protests has been marked by a heavy-handed crackdown on dissent. Police used force against protesters, leading to numerous injuries and arrests. This suppression has further galvanised opposition, uniting various factions, including students, opposition political parties, and civil society groups, in their demands for greater democratic freedoms. The perception that the government is unwilling to listen to its citizens or engage in meaningful dialogue has only intensified the unrest.
Implications
Political instability in Bangladesh The protests have thrown Bangladesh into a state of political turmoil, with potential long-term consequences. This political crisis risks weakening of state institutions and could result in a prolonged period of uncertainty, with possible impacts on governance, law, and order. However, with coming of interim government under Muhammed Yakub, democratic reforms can be implemented.
International concerns and human rights issue The protests had attracted international attention, particularly regarding the government’s human rights record. International organisations and foreign governments had expressed concern over the use of force against protesters and the suppression of dissent. There was a growing pressure on Bangladesh to respect human rights and engage in dialogue with opposition forces.
Minority particularly Hindus The violence against Hindus has increased significantly since former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s quit and departure to India. Tens of thousands of Hindus gathered in Chittagong, Bangladesh, to hold a protest rally against ongoing attacks on the community and demand safety and equal rights as citizens. The ongoing violence poses a significant challenge to the interim government, which was sworn in under Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus. The Bangladesh Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Oikya Parishad sent an open letter to Yunus, expressing “profound sorrow and concern” over the group’s “unprecedented violence” against minorities. The letter mentioned that the communal violence began immediately after Hasina left Dhaka, causing widespread fear, anxiety, and uncertainty among minorities in Bangladesh.
Impact on the informal sector The informal sector, which constitutes about 85 per cent of Bangladesh’s workforce, remains highly vulnerable. The unrest has exacerbated existing economic strains, leaving many workers without income due to lockdowns and curfews. With essential goods prices already surging, the financial burden on lower-income and middle-class households is expected to intensify, potentially leading to increased poverty levels.
Business and investment landscape The abrupt political transition has created uncertainty in the business environment. Business leaders had previously estimated losses of around US$ 10 billion due to the protests and the government’s handling of the situation. With Yunus at the helm, there is hope for restoring stability; however, businesses may remain cautious until a clear economic strategy is outlined. The need for immediate reforms to attract foreign investment will be critical.
Garment sector recovery The readymade garment industry, which accounts for over 80 per cent of Bangladesh’s export earnings, has faced severe disruptions. Factories were closed during the unrest, leading to significant revenue losses. As operations resume, the new government must ensure that supply chains are stabilised to maintain investor confidence and prevent further disruptions, particularly as global companies reassess their production strategies.
Foreign exchange reserves The economic damage and reduced export earnings have put immense pressure on Bangladesh’s foreign exchange reserves. The interim government will need to navigate these challenges carefully, particularly as it seeks to negotiate with international financial institutions like the IMF for loans. Restoring investor confidence will be crucial for stabilising reserves and ensuring economic recovery.
Delays in international agreements The political instability has already led to delays in negotiations with the European Union regarding new economic pacts. The interim government will need to prioritise these discussions to secure trade relations and economic support, which are vital for Bangladesh’s growth trajectory.
International scrutiny and relations The interim government may face heightened international scrutiny, particularly regarding human rights and democratic governance. The previous administration’s authoritarian tendencies have drawn criticism, and the new government will need to demonstrate a commitment to democratic principles to rebuild trust with international partners.
Travel warnings and safety concerns Several countries, including Canada and the US, have issued travel warnings for Bangladesh, which could deter tourists and investors. The new government must work to restore safety and stability to alleviate these concerns and encourage foreign engagement.
Geopolitical considerations Bangladesh’s geopolitical significance, especially in South Asia, means that Western nations may adopt a cautious approach in their interactions. While there may be calls for reform, countries like the US and India will likely balance their concerns with the need to maintain diplomatic and economic ties, given Bangladesh's strategic location and potential as a market.
Potential for migration and brain drain The unrest has prompted a surge in asylum applications from educated Bangladeshis seeking opportunities abroad. The interim government will need to address the underlying issues driving this migration to retain talent and foster economic development.
Long-Term Consequences
The transition to an interim government led by Yunus presents both challenges and opportunities for Bangladesh. In order to restore stability and address economic inequalities, the new administration must act swiftly to implement reforms that tackle pressing issues such as job scarcity, inflation, and corruption. The ability of the interim government to navigate these complex challenges while ensuring democratic freedoms and human rights will significantly influence Bangladesh’s future trajectory and its relations with global partners. The political landscape remains fragile, and the success of the Yunus administration will depend on its capacity to unify the country and foster an environment conducive to economic growth and social stability.
Implications on India
Bangladesh’s stability is crucial for regional security, particularly for neighbouring India. India shares a long and porous border with Bangladesh, and any significant political instability in Dhaka could lead to spillover effects, including an increase in cross-border terrorism and illegal migration. India also has strategic interests in Bangladesh, including economic ties and infrastructure projects, which could be jeopardised by continued unrest.
Economic ties India and Bangladesh have built strong economic ties over the past decade, with infrastructure and connectivity projects playing a crucial role. India has extended US$ 8 billion in credit to Bangladesh since 2016, focusing on road, rail, shipping, and port infrastructure development. The two nations have also engaged in commerce, including medical tourism, business expansion, and international garment trade. Bangladesh, a major player in the global garment industry, relies heavily on cotton imports from India. Bangladesh’s textile and garment sectors contribute 56 per cent of its total exports to India, making it a crucial trading partner in South Asia. The Union Ministry of Commerce reported that bilateral trade between the two countries reached US$ 13 billion in the 2023–24 financial year. Sheikh Hasina’s leadership has led to a significant trade surplus between India and Bangladesh, but the ongoing political turmoil in Bangladesh threatens to disrupt this economic partnership. The civil unrest and worsening economic situation have created security concerns that could impact Indian exports, commerce, and infrastructure projects in the neighbouring country. India’s exports to Bangladesh dropped from US$ 12.21 billion in 2022–23 to US$ 11 billion in 2023–24, and Bangladesh’s imports decreased from US$ 2 billion to US$ 1.84 billion in the most recent fiscal year. Indian exporters are concerned about the instability in Bangladesh, which could negatively affect commerce between the two nations.
Free trade agreement (FTA) India and Bangladesh discussed a free trade agreement (FTA) in October 2023. The agreement could streamline regulations, encourage investment and commerce, and potentially remove customs tariffs, boosting trade. According to a 2012 World Bank working paper, a full-product FTA could increase Bangladesh’s exports to India by 182 per cent, while a partial FTA could grow them by 134 per cent. This would strengthen Bangladesh’s trade transport infrastructure and commerce links. However, the current political crisis and Sheikh Hasina’s exit could delay or pause the FTA, potentially affecting the expansion of commerce and trade in new areas.
Textile and garment industry The ongoing crisis in Bangladesh could negatively impact the textile and garment industry, which exported US$ 42.613 billion worth of garments in 2021–22. The recent incidents of factories being set on fire have raised concerns about the future of this industry, as many textile units are owned by traders linked to the Awami League Party, making them vulnerable in the current political climate. India has the potential to supply garments to developed economies, but it faces drawbacks to this shift. Bangladesh, being a less developed country, benefits from zero-duty advantages while Indian goods face tariff barriers. If borders remain closed and duty-free export-import activities are suspended, there may be increased demand for Indian garments. However, it is still too early to make definitive predictions about the opportunities and gains that might arise from this situation.
Furthermore, there are concerns that if the situation worsens, Bangladesh might seek closer ties with China, altering the regional balance of power. The international community is also keenly watching to see if Bangladesh can navigate this crisis without descending into greater violence or political repression.
Border security and insurgency India has long stressed the need for a peaceful periphery so that it can focus on economic development. This has been a key driving force behind its “Neighbourhood First” approach. In 2015, India ratified a land boundary pact with Bangladesh, paving the way for high-growth ties. The two countries resolved a maritime boundary dispute, which they viewed as obstacles to enhancing their ties. India’s border states, West Bengal, Assam, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Tripura are at risk of being impacted by the ongoing unrest in Bangladesh. With India’s borders with Pakistan and China tense, New Delhi would hardly want another border—that with Bangladesh—to be unstable. New Delhi is already keeping a wary eye on the civil unrest in Myanmar and announced fencing of that border.
Safety and security of Indian nationals The unrest in Bangladesh has raised concerns about the safety of approximately 19,000 Indian nationals, including 9,000 students. The Indian government, through the High Commission in Dhaka, is actively monitoring the situation to ensure the well-being of its citizens amid escalating violence. In response to the unrest, many Indian students have returned home, with over 7,200 repatriated since July 2024. The new interim government must provide assurances regarding the safety of the remaining students, which could impact educational exchanges between India and Bangladesh.
Concerns for minority Hindus Reports of violence against minority Hindus, including attacks on their businesses and places of worship, have raised alarms. The Indian government will likely to advocate for the protection of minority rights in its discussions with the new Bangladeshi leadership, as the Hindu community constitutes around 8 per cent of Bangladesh’s population and has historically supported the Awami League.
Refugee crisis The crisis may lead to an influx of asylum seekers from Bangladesh, necessitating a reevaluation of India’s immigration policies and its capacity to accommodate new arrivals.
Conclusion
The future of Bangladesh hangs in the balance as the protests continue to unfold. For the government, the priority must be to engage in meaningful dialogue with the protesters and opposition forces. This could involve reforms to the quota system, measures to address corruption, and assurances of free and fair elections. The formation of interim government under Muhammad Yunus is in the right direction. For the international community, the focus should be on supporting a peaceful resolution to the crisis while holding the government accountable for its actions. If managed effectively, the crisis could lead to positive changes, including greater political accountability and more inclusive economic policies. However, if the situation deteriorates, Bangladesh risks entering a period of prolonged instability with far-reaching consequences for the region. The 2024 Protests in Bangladesh are a reflection of deeper societal frustrations with governance and economic inequality. The outcome of these protests will have significant implications for Bangladesh’s future, as well as for regional stability and international relations.
Way forward India must adopt a strategic and multifaceted approach to strengthen bilateral relations. First, India should engage diplomatically with the new leadership to address the safety and security concerns of the Indian nationals in Bangladesh, particularly the students, ensuring their protection during this transitional period. This engagement should also focus on advocating for the rights of minority communities, including Hindus, who have faced violence during the unrest. India must reevaluate its immigration policies in light of a potential influx of asylum seekers from Bangladesh, ensuring that it can accommodate those in need while maintaining domestic stability. Given the geopolitical significance of Bangladesh, India should leverage its historical ties and cooperative agreements to foster renewed collaboration in trade, infrastructure, and security. This includes revitalising discussions on FTA to enhance economic ties and addressing outstanding issues such as water sharing and border security. By adopting a proactive and adaptable stance, India can navigate the evolving political landscape in Bangladesh and reinforce its strategic interests in South Asia while promoting regional stability and cooperation.
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